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The Aleph Bet: Debating Metaphors for Information,
Data Handling and the Right to be Forgotten
Chris Prince, Micheal Vonn and Lex Gill*
Abstract
Court rulings in the European Union (EU) have now established that
individuals may seek erasure of personal information posted online. Typically,
this involves de-indexing a website from search results, and in some instances the
removal of content from primary sources sites. This has, in turn, led to debate
around both the logistics and the unintended consequences of removing information
online, and subsequent discussions have grappled with a range of images and
metaphors to map that new legal reality. This essay surveys that debate, the
imagery it employs, and the various logics associated with these metaphors.

A. IGNITING DEBATE: THE GONZÁLEZ CASES
Several years ago, in a case flowing from a data protection complaint lodged
against Google Spain, the European Court of Justice in Brussels sided with an
individual who had sought to have certain internet search results about him
removed.1 He was a businessman trying to secure investment, and believed that
details about a foreclosure eight years beforehand was hurting his livelihood, to
the extent that these details figured prominently in Google’s results page for
anyone who typed in his name.2 The specific relief he obtained through the court
decision was an order for Google Spain to de-index particular news stories from
search results for his given name on their regional top-level domain(es).
That case, the precedent it set, and the thousands of subsequent requests
from EU citizens which followed, set off a debate in privacy law, information
policy and data protection circles that continues today about what has come to
be called the ‘‘right to be forgotten”.3 The policy rationale is that dated
*
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Chris Prince (MLIS, McGill University of King’s College, BA Hons); Micheal Vonn
(Policy Director, BC Civil Liberties Association); Lex Gill (McGill, Google Fellow —
Citizen Lab, CCLA). Please note opinions expressed are solely those of authors, not their
organization or institution; thanks to Christopher Parsons and Tamir Israel for early
suggestions and Andrea Slane for her last stage, devil’s advocate review.
“Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos” (2014) 128:2 Harv L
Rev 735, online: <http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/12/google-spain-sl-v-agenciaespanola-de-proteccion-de-datos/>
See European Court of Justice, Luxembourg, 13 May 2014, Google Spain SL, Google Inc.
v Agencia Española de Proteccio´n de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, Case C131/12 (European Union), online: <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN>; see also Google Spain v AEPD and
Mario Costeja González, Wikipedia, online: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Spain_v_AEPD_and_Mario_Costeja_Gonz%C3%A1lez> (accessed 26 February
2018).
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information, which no longer reflects the reality of an individual’s circumstances,
ought not to be preserved (or highlighted) where it is prejudicial to the individual
and no countervailing public policy reason exists for its preservation.4 For some,
the right to be forgotten (RTBF) evokes a kind of ahistorical revisionism, a
rewrite of the past, as individuals seek to conceal embarrassing details, faults or
wrongs they’ve been forced to publicly account for.5 It is also important to state
at the outset that search result de-indexation as a legal remedy is not always
bound to a privacy breach or ‘‘right to be forgotten” claim. Indeed, opponents of
a right to be forgotten often stress risks to a ‘‘right to know” if individuals seek to
control information dispersed online, hinting darkly at possible abuse by
governments, companies or criminals.
Yet, as with all issues related to digital privacy, there is also an opposing
view. Recognition of a justiciable right to control inaccurate (or superfluous,
irrelevant, or out-of-date) personal information represents an opportunity for a
second chance and restores some of the practical obscurity which has
traditionally been a significant privacy protection. In the EU context, it also
reflects a core commitment to ‘‘informational self-determination”, a
foundational concept in EU data protection law stretching back over three
decades.6 The RTBF represents a legal counterbalance to the distortionary
effects of contemporary search algorithms, which — at least in some cases —
tend to privilege salacious, fantastical and damning ‘‘content” over factual
3

4

5

6

It should be noted that each jurisdiction seems to translate and interpret the term slightly
differently — the French refer to a right to obscurity, the Spanish to oblivion, the
Germans to objection. As a legal concept and commercial obligation, it has its roots in
basic privacy principles established by the OECD and other data standards setting
bodies decades earlier. These principles (embedded now in many countries’ privacy laws)
set out a positive right for individuals to ensure that information collected and retained
about them by organizations was accurate and current; see OECD, ‘‘Data quality”,
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013),
online: <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm#part2>.
Just as we extend pardons to criminals, or obscure the identity of youth offenders, there is
the generally accepted notion that organizations should allow individuals at some point
to ‘‘move on” from past experiences and records of these infractions. As reasonable as
this may sound, however, it is surprisingly controversial when that same principle and
right is applied to commercial operators, for a number of reasons. See Steven C. Bennett,
‘‘The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives” (2012) 30 BJIL 161,
online: <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol30/iss1/4>.
All manner of shadowy figures spring to mind who might exploit this avenue to obscure
or erase public awareness of past actions; this recalls Brin’s observation that when issues
of privacy and accountability arise, we always want privacy for ourselves and
transparency for everyone else. See David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will
Technology Force Us to Choose between Privacy and Freedom? (New York: Perseus
Press, 1998).
On Informationelle Selbstbestimmung, or informational self-determination, see Michael
L. Rustad and Sanna Kulevska, ‘‘Reconceptualising the Right to be Forgotten to Enable
Trans-Atlantic Data Flow” (2015) 28:2 Harv JL & Tech 356 at 356-60.
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accuracy. As Bruce Schneier has noted, ‘‘although privacy is definitely a
technology problem, it’s even more of a people problem. The greatest challenges
to privacy are fear and convenience . . . and until we get our ‘needs’ under
control, we’re not going to have much privacy.”7

B. DRAWING LESSIONS: HOW ARE ARGUMENTS OVER RTBF
FRAMED?
There are now entire books devoted to the implications and implementations
of this new digital right and other online freedoms.8 Unpacking these legal
developments is not the focus of this essay. Rather, we are more interested in the
symbolism, imagery and associations in which various parties have invested. This
may seem an esoteric concern, but we assert that the specific analogies, images
and evocations used to explain the Internet, describe information flows and
highlight human rights carry very real resonance. The metaphors we choose to
describe technology have profound legal, political, and economic ramifications.
This paper is particularly concerned with the metaphors used to contest or
undermine the ‘‘right to be forgotten”.
In courts, legislatures, conferences and boardrooms, metaphors matter a
great deal. For example, in pushing for greater transparency, digital rights
groups, open data activists and access to information advocates understandably
highlight gaps in knowledge.9 This is called the ‘‘memory loss” argument, which
often arises from important information rights work, but also echoes our current
immersion in a globalized political economy. Within the ubiquitous logic and
rhetoric of transparency, the absence of information is readily understood as an
attempt at concealment (physical, informational, emotional) and so is
immediately suspect.10
A second thread of opposition to the RTBF concept is based on efficacy,
namely, opposition to the purportedly unnecessary compliance burden for
information providers (in particular, Google or Microsoft) as they manually vet
requests and amend local data indices accordingly.11 Critics of the RTBF are
7

8

9

10

Bruce Schneier, ‘‘Fear and Convenience,” in Marc Rotenberg, Julia Horwitz & Jeramie
Scott, eds., Privacy in the Modern Age:The Search for Solutions (New York, The New
Press, 2015), 200.
Viktor Mayer-Sch—nberger, Delete: the Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Paul Bernal, Internet Privacy Rights:
Rights to Protect Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Meg Leta
Jones, CTRL + Z: the Right to be Forgotten (New York, New York University Press,
2016) [Jones, CTRL + Z], being the most notable to date.
Overlooking that European privacy laws have their earliest antecedents in anti-libel law
precisely for this purpose. Either way, they favor maximizing disclosure and records
being published by default over individuals’ reputational history; see Jones, CTRL + Z,
ibid, at 30.
See Transparent Lives: Surveillance in Canada, ‘‘Trend 9 - Watching by the People:
From Them to Us” (2014), online: <http://www.surveillanceincanada.org/>.
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quick to point out that the primary local sources of the information (e.g. news
sites, blogs, archived court decisions, etc.) are left untouched in cases of search
engine de-indexing. This line of reasoning could be called the ‘‘costly placebo”
argument, which the more industry-oriented experts are fond of highlighting.
Finally — and this is the question we aim here to unpack — there is a third
line of argumentation based neither on the narrative of transparency nor on an
axis of cost and efficacy. Instead, the analysis focuses upon order and simplicity,
and picks up on a particular thread of Google’s stated mission: to organize ‘‘the
world’s information”. 12 Actors working in opposition to any form of
information removal (including, but not limited to RTBF measures) often
liken the company’s search engine to a library catalogue, and from that imagery
proceed to oppose a range of legal take-down options said to be comparable to
removing ‘‘cards from a card catalogue” or ‘‘pulling books from the shelves”.
Since the 2014 González decision, Google has cultivated dozens of such editorials
and expert opinions echoing this premise.13 We know, because we Googled it.

C. COMPARING RIGHTS: AN ANALOGY FOR DIGITAL RECALL
This ‘‘library argument” has given critics of the EU court decision a
narrative tool to evoke a collective and understandable aversion to both
censorship and information loss. These are real risks, quite rightly seen as
offensive to freedom of thought, shared heritage and collective identity. Beyond
its success in evoking grim associations however, it is worth asking how well this
analogy stands up in practice. Does all digital content make up a shared library,
with Google as its de facto card catalogue? Is the right to be forgotten really akin
11

12

13

Most of the firms affected by the ruling are well-financed and exceptionally technically
adept (i.e. removing links between data points is within their grasp); developing a process
in response to individual requests seems feasible. However, much of the technical
community appears to question the essential effectiveness of any remedy based upon
information severance.
Google, ‘‘About the Company”, online: <https://www.google.com/about/company/
>.
See e.g. ‘‘The right to be forgotten from Google? Forget it”, Fortune (12 March 2015),
online: <http://fortune.com/2015/03/12/the-right-to-be-forgotten-from-google-forgetit-says-u-s-crowd/>; David Drummond, ‘‘We need to talk about the right to be
forgotten” The Guardian (10 July 2014), online: <http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/jul/10/right-to-be-forgotten-european-ruling-google-debate>;
Jeffrey Toobin, ‘‘The Solace of Oblivion”, The New Yorker (29 September 2014), online:
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion>; ‘‘On being forgotten” The Economist (17 May 2014), online: <http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21602219-right-be-forgotten-sounds-attractive-it-creates-more-problems-itsolves-being>; Eloise Gratton, ‘‘Forget about bringing the ‘right to be forgotten’ to
Canada”, Financial Post (9 May 2016), online: <http://business.financialpost.com/fpcomment/forget-about-bringing-the-right-to-be-forgotten-to-canada>; Sylvia Stead,
‘‘We’re not in the unpublishing business”, Globe and Mail (29 April 2016), online:
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/community/inside-the-globe/public-editor-werenot-in-the-unpublishing-business/article29805423/>.
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to censorship, to pulling cards from that catalogue or books off a shelf? And,
ultimately, are these simplifications useful (socially, politically, legally) or do they
obfuscate more than they provisionally reveal?
As an initial set up, it makes some sense to begin with Google. Organizing
the world’s information remains their most famous corporate ambition. Though
now technically a subsidiary of Alphabet (and having in some sense ‘‘evolved”
beyond such a singular focus), global data capture plainly remains part of their
vision, culture, and business model.14 Firms like Microsoft and Google appear
poised to achieve this vision eventually, having built upon the investments and
technological developments flowing from three decades of advancement in
computational power, digital storage, mass digitization and global data
networking.15
A specific example of the scale of digital collation helps illustrate that last
point: a few years ago it was widely discussed that the world’s largest collection
of photography had become Facebook, which publicly acknowledged at the time
storing roughly 100 petabytes of digital imagery on its servers with 240 billion
photographs.16 Users from around the world uploaded that data over the past
decade, while the firm has invested significantly in facial recognition, web
analytics and artificial intelligence so as to automate and index this massive
archive. Yet few would conflate this dataset with a global library of photographs;
the company would be extremely unlikely to risk making the entire repository
publicly searchable or open to browse.
14

15

16

It is also worth noting this universal mission has had antecedents: in the history of
information design figures like Paul Otlet, H.G. Wells and Vannevar Bush all believed
global knowledge could be structured and made accessible to all. Each of those earlier
figures envisaged, began to build, or rendered operational technologies that sought to
categorize, index and cross-reference fragmentary units of knowledge, information and
data. See Alex Wright, Cataloging the World: Paul Otlet and the Birth of the Information
Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); H. G. Wells, World Brain (London:
Methuen & Co., 1938); Vannevar Bush, ‘‘As We May Think”, The Atlantic (July 1945),
online: <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1945/07/as-we-may-think/
303881/>.
Or have they? Can the world’s information in its entirety be organized? What would such
global information control look like? To return to the library metaphor, can all written
culture and history ever be fully digitized, much less stored, much less comprehensively
indexed and be made available? These questions are not quite as epistemological or
abstract as they would have previously appeared — and clearly the system design choices
of global data firms have a direct bearing on how the internet functions as a knowledge
resource, communications service, or shared archive. Their indexing protocols, technical
standards, search algorithms, and retention practices all form part of the answer to how
information is searched, retrieved and shared globally.
Rich Miller, ‘‘Facebook Builds Exabyte Data Centers for Cold Storage”, Data Center
Knowledge (18 January 2013), online: <http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2013/01/18/facebook-builds-new-data-centers-for-cold-storage/>; Facebook,
‘‘Scaling the Facebook data warehouse to 300 PB” (10 April 2014), online: <https://
code.facebook.com/posts/229861827208629/scaling-the-facebook-data-warehouse-to300-pb/>.
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D. EVOKING LOSS: ANALOGIES FOR DELETION
If it is conceded that these companies are not acting as libraries per se, their
proponents might then say that we ought to forget arguments about Alphabet
and all its data-holdings; the RTBF threatens the veracity and viability of the
traditional basic search function, which operates like a library’s card index and is
used by millions of people every minute of every day to locate information. Here
a personal right of the data-subject is posited against public access to
information about the data subject.17
Evoking card catalogues, while folksy, is misleading on two main grounds.
First, as any long-time user of Google will be aware, the search engine long ago
ceased to be a monolithic, centralized one search/one result experience — far
from it. In fact, Google’s search results are both highly contextual and highly
customized. There is no longer a ‘‘default” Google. Even if you turn
customization features off, results are always regionalized by language and
location through IP address analysis. To be clear, users of Google Search are not
sharing the same card catalogue when we do most online or mobile searches,
least so when we have an account with the provider in question. What we are
provided is a highly tailored set of filtered results, according to past site visits,
search history, reading habits and other variables.18
The other important shortfall of the card catalogue metaphor involves the
way in which details and links of indexed web content are accessed via its search
services. The catalogue analogy is premised on a reader envisaging some massive,
centralized registry in Mountain View. A special, multi-hued building where all
the results, all the searches, all the links are kept safe and up to date. Anyone who
has observed the history of online search will recognize that mental model as a
dated and misleading artefact. Google outgrew it long ago, and now operates
tens of thousands of servers worldwide, housed in 40 major data centres. 19
17

18

19

As noted above, a wide contingent of experts seem to advance this claim, even though it
seems to us inaccurate - both in how online searching actually works, and how the EU
ruling has been implemented to date.
Search pages and lists of hits are adjusted by geographic location (country and city),
ranked by language, and when activated, sorted by individual user profile and use
history. While this can be miraculously efficient, especially for topic-specific research
over time, it should completely dispel the ‘‘universality of search” or ‘‘objectivity of
results” assumptions made in critiques of RTBF. As users, we are already being nudged
to recall certain things and forget others every time we search. That is consciously
designed into the system of personalized online services across nearly every platform.
Again, such a fine-tuned and targeted set of results, served up at the individualized level,
departs almost entirely from the fixed library card system that many commentators seem
to evoke. See Google, ‘‘Personalized Search for Everyone” (December 2009), online:
<https://googleblog.blogspot.ca/2009/12/personalized-search-for-everyone.html>;
Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You (New York: Penguin
Books, 2011).
Their indexing and results efforts are massively distributed; which in the context of the
RTBF debate means there is no unified catalogue or index — but rather dozens of
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E. ON COMPILING ACCURATE COMPARISONS
If we reject as false the analogy applied recently in criticisms of the EU Right
to be Forgotten (laden with references to lost libraries, pilfered catalogues, book
burning and the like), it is reasonable to suggest another analogy as Canadian
courts, legislators and regulators cast about for precedents. If the library is an
inapt image, what better fits the nature of the technology and better accounts for
the actual values at stake? One useful place to begin is to inquire into the purposes
of mapping the old rules onto the new tech. Whose interests are served? Is
encryption like a lock on a door, or can it be the door itself? Is it like a safe inside
one’s house, or perhaps solely the combination?
Does it even make sense to try to map the rights and responsibilities of
digitally mediated life into a spatial metaphor (like a certain type of building)? Or
would that only serve up a rough equivalency, transposing old values and rules?
As many critics have noted, the dichotomy between ‘‘online” and ‘‘offline” has
been rendered fairly feeble in terms of rights protection; clinging to notions of
buildings and maps are cultural hang ups we may need to exchange for a more
sophisticated calculus of value(s).
This comparison problem was identified by Jennifer Nedelsky decades ago,
which is that privacy has traditionally been conceptualized in spatial terms or in
connection with physical property (at least in the common law tradition). 20
Bodily integrity is recognized as the first and most protected spatial zone, with
concentric rings such as the home, and the property the home sits on eventually
fanning out into the ‘‘public”. Digitally mediated life renders that common law,
spatial grasp of privacy (i.e. the home as castle image) almost nonsensical. It was
always a tradition-bound ideal for personal sanctity, as opposed to a cognitive
model of privacy or universal norm.

F. ALTERNATIVE MODELS — INFORMATION MARKETS, DATA
EXTRACTION, MEMORY REGULATION
Plainly, requests to delink old information from EU citizens are an
administrative burden for regional operations and add to legal compliance
costs. Yet as a practical matter of data processing the ‘‘RTBF effect” seems to

20

regional indices. That last regional duplication is reflected plainly in what is probably the
clearest refutation of RTBF critics, namely the firm’s own transparency reports about its
compliance with takedown requests, copyright infringement issues and link removals.
Since the ECJ ruling, the company has developed practices and procedures, policy and
reporting about their implementation of this legal obligation. See Google Transparency
Report, ‘‘European privacy requests for search removals” (May 2016), online: <https://
www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/>; see also Google,
‘‘FAQ”, online: <https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/faq/?hl=en>.
Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘‘Reconceiving Rights as Relationship” (1993) 1:1 Rev Const Stud 15
at 15-16, online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2045687>.
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have little impact. Neither Google’s wider offerings in the EU or services
elsewhere have been curtailed.21 They still offer their full range of tools and
applications in the EU market. Compared to other types of compliance (e.g.
copyright takedowns) or government requests for private data (e.g. lawful
access), the firm appears to have set out some quite straight-forward factors
when it considers results removal requests, and should be commended for
implementing these in a clear, transparent fashion.22
In 2017, Google — in terms of services provided, data collected, additional
analysis brought to bear, markets reached, etc. — has evolved well beyond
evocation of the dimly remembered card catalogue of the local library. The card
catalogue analogy also fails in terms of granularity. A card catalogue was never
able to point you to an obscure reference to a private individual who is not the
subject of or important to the subject of the book or article in question. The
route through which you gain access to information in a library is via entry
points of subject, author, or theme. Libraries do not provide a ‘‘service” which
allows you to query discreet local personalities, and certainly a card catalogue
was never meant to provide such a function.
Besides entirely misconstruing the scale and sensitivity of information
involved, it is also plainly an anachronistic evocation (and one that a shrinking
number of readers will even connect with). Would any credible pundit today
evoke IBM’s past business and refer to one of its data centers as a warehouse of
electronic typewriters? Would a logistics expert liken the global operations of
McDonald’s to ‘‘a string of corner delis” simply on the basis of having a solid
burger in common with their local diner? Yet IT experts, IP lawyers and digital
media observers make off-side library analogies with alarming regularity (and
almost eerie harmony) in describing search tools.
Not only is the scope and intensity of the enterprise completely miscast, but
the much broader meaning and influence of the larger commercial entity
vanishes. As familiar as the image evoked may be, it occludes as much as it
reveals. Thinking about what online services firms like Microsoft, Apple,
Amazon or Google actually provide (in addition to the social functions they
increasingly perform) we would argue that any of the following alternatives
would be more apt.
We have some firms positioning their products as a coach or guide (e.g.
Apple as Concierge, given integration of ratings and maps); we have others
developing tools to act as virtual tutors or oracles (e.g. Google as Advisor, given
its assistant tools and AI / Nest products); others are diversifying apps that take
21

22

Note, for example, in the period since the EU ruling, the company’s stock valuation rose
from approx. $500 US to $700 US per common share: Reuters, online: <http://
www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/chart?symbol=GOOGL.O>.
Google, ‘‘Common material factors involved in a decision not to delist a page”
(November 2015), online: <https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/faq/Google_EU_privacy_data_nov2015.pdf>.
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on a merchant / marketer / publicist function (e.g. Amazon as Bazaar, given its
video, content and sales integration).
Other platforms seek to disrupt traditional players in the economics of
information by offering individuals specialized collector / compiler / translator
capabilities (e.g. Facebook as Broker, providing macro level business
intelligence, trend spotting and visualization). Finally, new features in previous
systems now give users the ability to become their own broadcaster / educator /
curator (e.g. Microsoft as Instructor, given writing tools, media filter and redistribution network).
Each of the analogies above — X as Guide, Y as Agent, Z as Market — we
believe to be more precise than likening a search function to a card catalogue, or
a search engine company to a library. While the library metaphor may be
comfortingly familiar to courts and legislators, it is precisely its ease which
misleads. While it is true that you can find content on a given subject, like you
could through a library’s card catalogue, the card catalogue analogy never bore
out when the subject matter was mostly private citizens (which is what’s at issue
in the RTBF). And as reflects the online sphere as a whole, other images,
premised on an exchange of values, make far more sense.

G. INTEGRATING IDEAS OF MEMORY REGULATION
No matter which precedent or metaphor holds, one reality to acknowledge
(for better or worse) is that US legal, judicial and regulatory models generally are
still very much built to facilitate circulation of online commerce as opposed to
regulating flows of personal information or prejudging novel products. Data
regulation outside the EU (with the APEC bloc as another clear example)
favours exchange, value creation, innovation and market-based approaches over
rights impact analysis, protection of reputation or informational selfdetermination (as the Germans cast the issue).23 To a large extent, Canada
and the UK seem to split the difference.
A second observation would be to note that firms such as Alphabet and
Facebook, growing as they have out of the US, have much more effective
influence on the thinking in regulatory circles and legal deliberations in North
America. Whether that is a permanent feature, or subject to market correction,
only time will tell. The past woes of Apple, Nortel and RIM show that setbacks
can be merely sessional or ultimately terminal. But surely we may note from the
early dot-com era that with many aggressive players (think WorldCom, Global
Crossing or Tyco) it takes only a few offside decisions to dispel years of public
trust and regulatory negotiation.
23

That culture variance will shock no one who has followed debates about digital rights or
EU-US data transfers, then switched cognitive channels to hear Silicon Valley reps talk
up Big Data. The recent collapse of the Safe Harbour arrangement, EU demands for a
US Courts Redress Act, and the European Parliament studies on mass surveillance, all
underscore the gaps between a commerce-centered debate and one focussed on rights and
recourse.
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The third remark to be made is that public opinion polling clearly indicates
that a great many people are deeply concerned about what information is made
available about them on the internet, very often without their knowledge or
express consent.24 Individuals are now forced into the position of actively
defending their reputations from inaccurate postings or seeking removal of
offensive personal attacks in ‘‘comments” sections. Canada is by no means
immune to these developments and the EU model of examining RTBF claims
may yet develop into a significant proposal to protect the privacy rights of
ordinary citizens.
Yet, at the same time, neither American nor Canadian consumers as a whole
seem terribly exercised about the issue to date. While online services in North
America do not appear to enjoy a great store of consumer trust25, users also seem
not to see great harms lurking in retention periods that are too long or
information-sharing practices that are too loose. Outside a vocal privacy
constituency in the US and an active human rights community in Canada, a
‘‘right to be forgotten” seems to be a murky concept for many web enthusiasts. A
good many people might well ask: why would anyone ever want to be forgotten?

H. POSTSCRIPT — MISCASTING THE LIBRARY AND FORGETTING
Two final thoughts, one on libraries, the other on the function of forgetting
and how we might conceive of each in an online age. Libraries as specific sites
have a special place in our collective conception of culture. We hold them with a
reverence and respect that might also be afforded places of worship. These are
complex associations, as with any institution, and are part memory, part myth,
part hope.26
But, once again, that zone of solitude and quiet plainly dissolves any
meaningful comparison between the Internet and a library, because online
24

25

26

Centre for International Governance Innovation & IPSOS, ‘‘2016 CIGI-Ipsos Global
Survey on Internet Security and Trust” (2016) online: <https://www.cigionline.org/
internet-survey-2016>; Pew Research Center, ‘‘Americans and Cybersecurity” (January 2017), online: <http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/
01/26102016/Americans-and-Cyber-Security-final.pdf>; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘2016 Survey of Canadians on Privacy” (December 2016), online:
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/research/explore-privacy-research/2016/por_2016_12/>.
US Department of Commerce, ‘‘Lack of Trust in Internet Privacy and Security May
Deter Economic and other Online Activities” (13 May 2016), online: <https://
www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/lack-trust-internet-privacy-and-security-may-deter-economic-and-other-online-activities>.
But certainly an aspect of the library’s appeal in our thinking about its place in society is
the solace they seem to offer. They are among the few recognized locales left in our
culture where one can experience quiet in an environment absent of commerce, be left to
think and work at one’s own pace, do so anonymously, and do so without cost. There are
very few sites left like this in many communities and this is plainly something to be
guarded.
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advertising, e-commerce, auction sites and social network platforms have for
years dominated the internet experience. Perhaps if the RTBF debate was
unfolding two decades ago, in the early Web era, the analogy might hold. Now it
is dated, and worse, misleading.
And as to the function of forgetfulness, for not keeping everything forever,
for placing some rational limit on what information is retained, our greatest poet
and philosopher upon the library-as-ideal covered this ground chillingly. In
Borges’ The Library of Babel (1941) we are confronted with the image and hubris
of keeping information for its own sake, in perpetuity, where he imagined a
mythic and endless archive, floor after floor, wing after wing, filled endlessly with
books capturing every possible iteration and arrangement of every word and
letter. It was complete, to be sure — in the story its administrators and librarians
cannot find its beginning or end — but this arbitrary completeness is what also
renders its collection inhuman, incomprehensible, and ultimately, useless. 27
In this regard, whether it is called a ‘‘need to forget” or an ethic of erasure,
organizations and institutions are not very different from people. They cannot
retain and remember everything — not if they wish to stay in a meaningful sense
human. And just like people, what they ultimately choose to forget, to let go, tells
you far more about their humanity than anything they ever claim to know.

27

This was meant to be a parable obviously about the limits of understanding and
knowledge — but there is also a lesson of humility there for any organization or
institution based on the acquisition and ordering of information. That one cannot
proceed blindly at the act of collection to the detriment or indifference of human
concerns — because what precisely becomes the end of such an endeavour? Whose
interests are served and furthered, when individuals plead for assistance, pardon,
forgiveness in a way, only to be coldly rebuffed? What good is advanced? This has not, of
course, kept it far from the imaginations of virtual librarians, and the story itself has
spawned its own imagined model online: See Library of Babel, online: <https://
libraryofbabel.info/>; see also Kate Bernheimer and Andrew Bernheimer, ‘‘Fairy Tale
Architecture: The Library of Babel,” Places Journal (December 2013), online: <https://
placesjournal.org/article/fairy-tale-architecture-the-library-of-babel>; Alison Flood,
‘‘Virtual Library of Babel makes Borges’s infinite store of books a reality — almost‘‘ The
Guardian (4 May 2015), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/may/04/
virtual-library-of-babel-makes-borgess-infinite-store-of-books-a-reality-almost>.

